tion possibilities, the advantages of an integrated energy policy have become evident.
In this paper the importance of coordinated energy planning and pricing will be emphasized, with particular reference to the interrelationships among the pricing policies adopted in various energy subsectors such as electric power, petroleum, natural gas, cod, and traditional fuels (e.g., firewood, crop residues, and dung). Nonconventional sources can also be fitted into this framework. We will focus on the LDC context where, generally, higher levels of market distortion, shortages of foreign exchange and resources for development, larger numbers of poor households whose basic needs must be met, greater reliance on traditional fuels, and relative paucity of energy data add to the already complicated problems faced by energy planners in the developed countries. We will also touch on the chief investment issues to the extent that they strongly influence pricing policy.
Before developing an integrated framework for power and energy pricing, it is necessary to briefly discuss what is meant by national energy planning. The broad underlying rationale is to make the best use of energy resources to promote socioeconomic development and improve citizens' welfare and quality of life. Therefore energy planning is an essential part of overall national economic planning, and should be carried out and implemented in close coordination with the latter. However, in energy planning, the principal emphasis is on the comprehensive and disaggregate analysis of the energy sector, with due regard for the main interactions with the rest of the economy. In a strictly technical sense, the energy planner's role might be confined to seeking the least-cost method of meeting future energy requirements. However, energy planning also includes a variety of other objectives, including reducing dependence on foreign sources, supplying basic energy needs of the poor, reducing the trade and foreign exchange deficit, priority development of special regions or sectors of the economy, raising sufficient revenues to f i a n c e energy sector development (at least partially), ensuring continuity of supply and price stability, preserving the environment, and so on.
In general, energy planning requires analysis at the following three hierarchical levels in relation to fundamental national objectives: (1) links between the energy sector and the rest of the economy; (2) interactions between different subsectors within the energy sector; and (3) activities in each individual energy subsector. The steps involved in the planning procedure usually include energy supply and demand analyses and forecasting, energy balancing, policy formulation, and impact analysis, to meet short-, medium-, and long-range goals. Initially, these activities may be carried out at a relatively simple level; later, as niques, including computer modeling, may be implemented. The institutional structure should also be rationalized by setting up a central energy authority (CEA), or ministry of energy, with its principal focus on energy planning and policymaking. The execution of policy, and day-to-day operations, would remain the responsibility of the electricity utilities or petroleum corporations that already exist in practically all countries.
SCOPE A N D OBJECTIVES OF PRICING .
To put pricing in proper context, we note that it is only one of the policy tools available for optimal supply-demand planning and management; others include physical controls, technical methods (including research and development), and education and propaganda. Since these tools are interrelated, their use should be well coordinated. Physical controls are most effective in the short run when there are unforeseen shortages of energy. All methods of physically limiting consumption are included in this category, such as load shedding and rotating power cuts in the electricity subsector, as well as reducing the supply of gasoline or banning the use of motor cars during some periods. Technical means on the supply side include the least cost or cheapest means of producing a given form of energy, the best mix of fuels, and research and development of substitute fuels such as woodalcohol for gasoline; on the demand side, they include introducing higher efficiency energy conversion devices, such as better stoves for woodfuel. Education and propaganda on the supply side include efforts to make citizens aware of external diseconomies such as pollution, and supportive of re-afforestation schemes to preserve the environment; on the demand side, they include public education for energy conservation.
Pricing is a very important tool, especially in the long run. As discussed below, the pricing and investment decisions should be closely related. However, energy supply systems -e.g., electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; oil and gas wells and pipelines; coal mines; and forests-usually require large capital investments with long lead times and lifetimes. Therefore, once the investments decision is made, usually on the basis of the conventional least-cost method of meeting demand by subsector, with due regard for interfuel substitution possibilities, there is a lock-in effect with respect to supply. Thus prices should be related to the long-run planning horizon. On the demand side also, energy conversion devices (e.g.. motor cars, gas stoves, , . . . .
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, income levels and have relatively long lifetimes, thus limiting consumers' ability to respond in the short run to changes in relative fuel prices.
The objectives of energy pricing are closely related to the goals of energy planning, but they are more specific. First, the economic growth objective requires that pricing policy should promote economically efficient allocation of resources, both within the energy sector and between it and the rest of the economy. In general terms, this implies that future energy use would be a t optimal levels, with the price (or the consumer's willingness to pay) for the marginal unit of energy used reflecting the incremental resource cost of supply to the national economy. Relative fuel prices should also.influence the pattern of consumption in the direction of the optimal or least-cost mix of energy sourEes required to meet future demand. Distortions and constraints in the economy necessitate the use of shadow prices and economic second-best adjustments, as described in the next section.
Second, the social objective recognizes every citizen's basic right to be supplied with certain minimum energy needs. Given the existence of significant numbers of poor consumers and also wide disparities of income, this implies subsidized prices, at least for low-income consumers.
Third, the government would be concerned with financial objectives relating to the viability and autonomy of the energy sector. This would usually be effected by pricing policies that permit institutions (typically, government-owned) in the different energy subsectors to earn a fair rate of return on assets and to self-finance an acceptable portion of the investments required to develop future energy resources. Fourth, energy conservation is also an objective of pricing policy. While prevention of unnecessary waste is an important goal, other reasons often underlie the desire to conserve certain fuels. These include the desire for greater independence from foreign sources (e.g., oil imports) and the necessity of reducing the consumption of woodfuel because of deforestation and erosion problems.
Fifth, we recognize a number of additional objectives, such as the need for price stability, to prevent shocks to consumers from large price fluctuations, and the need for simplicity in energy pricing structures, to avoid confusing the public and to simplify metering and billing.
Finally, there are other specific objectives, such as promoting regional development (e.g., rural electrification) or specific sectors (e.g., export-oriented industries), and other sociopolitical, legal, and environmental constraints.
I n summary, therefore, price is most effective as a long-run policy tool. From the viewpoint of economic efficiency, the price indicates to suppliers the consumers' willingness to pay and the use-value of energy; to the consumers, it signals the present and future opportunity costs of supply that draws on various energy sources.
We conclude this section with a brief review of the pervasive role that most governments play in the pricing of commercial energy resources, and the relative neglect of issues relating to traditional forms of energy. Governments exercise direct influence, usually through the ownership of energy sources or price controls. Indirect influences occur through such means as taxes, import duties, subsidies, market quotas, taxes on energy-using equipment, and government-guided investments in energy resources.
In practically all developing countries, the electric utility is government owned. In oil and gas production, refining, and distribution, as well as in coal mining, both public and private organizations operate, often side by side. However, irrespective of the form of ownership, all governments exercise some form of wholesale or retail price control, usually at several levels, including during production, during refining, after transport or transmission, and so on. Income and excise taxes are also levied from both public and private energy sector companies.
Generally, certain fuels in specific uses tend to be subsidized, although leakages and abuses of subsidies by nontargeted consumer groups also occur. Thus kerosene for lighting and cooking, rural electricity for lighting and agricultural pumping, and diesel fuel for transportation commonly qualify for subsidies. Cross-subsidies exist between different fuels, user groups, and geographic regions; therefore high-priced gasoline may finance the subsidy on kerosene, industrial electricity users may subsidize household consumers, and a uniform national pricing policy usually implies subsidization of energy users in remote areas by those living in urban centers. The principal problem associated with subsidies is that the energy producer may not be able to raise sufficient revenues to finance investment to meet expanding demand, or even to maintain existing facilities, and thus shortages eventually result. Furthermore, cross-subsidies give consumers the wrong price signals, with consequent misallocation of investments.
Import and export duties, excise taxes, and sales taxes are levied, often by several levels of government, from federal to municipal, at various stages in the production, processing, distribution, and retailing chain. In many developing countries, the combined levies are several hundred percent of the original product price for some items, and negative or close to zero for others. Several less obvious methods, such as property taxes, water rights and user charges, and franchise fees are also used to influence energy use. Energy prices are also affected by the wide range of royalty charges, profit sharing schemes, and exploration agreements that are made for the development of oil and gas resources between governments and multinational companies.
Other policy instruments are often used to reinforce pricing policies, such as quotas on imported or scarce forms of energy, coupled with high prices. Conservation regulations may affect depletion rates for oil and gas, while the availability of hydropower from some nlultipurpose dams may be subordinate to the use of water for imgation or river navigation. Many special policies involving tax holidays and concession, import subsidies, export bonuses, government loans or grants, high taxes on large automobiles, etc., are also used to affect energy use.
The traditional fuels subsector has been relatively neglected because transactions involving these forms of energy are usually of a noncommercial nature. However, there is growing acceptance of the coordinated use of indirect methods such as displacement of fuelwood used in cooking by subsidizing kerosene and LPG, increasing the supply of fuelwood by re-afforestation programs and effective distribution of charcoal, enforcing stiffer penalties for illegal felling of trees, and proper watershed management.
E C O N O M I C FRAMEWORK
Because the objectives mentioned above are often not mutually consistent, a realistic integrated energy pricing structure must be flexible enough to permit tradeoffs among them. To allow this flexibility, the formulation of energy pricing policy must be carried out in two stages. In the first stage, a set of prices that strictly meets the economic efficiency objective is determined, based on a consistent and rigorous framework. The second stage consists of adjusting these efficient prices (established in the first step), to meet all the other objectives. The latter procedure is more ad hoc, with the extent of the adjustments being determined by the relative importance attached to the different objectives. In the rest of this section, we discuss the importance of shadow pricing and develop the economic framework that permits the efficient pricing of energy. The second stage adjustments due to noneconomic factors are discussed in the next section.
Shadow pricing theory has been developed mainly for use in the costbenefit analysis of projects. ' However, since investment decisions in the energy sector are closely related to the pricing of energy outputs, for consistency the same shadow pricing framework should be used in both instances. Shadow prices are used instead of market prices (or private financial costs), to represent the true economic opportunity costs of resources.
In the idealized world of perfect competition, the interaction of atomistic profit-maximizing producers and atomistic utility-maximizing consumers yields market prices that reflect the correct economic opportunity costs, and scarce resources including energy will be efficiently allocated. However, in the real world, distortions may result from monopoly practices, external economies and diseconomies (which are not internalized in the private market), interventions in the market process through taxes, import duties, and subsidies, etc., and these distortions cause market prices for goods and services to diverge substantially from their shadow prices or true economic opportunity costs. Therefore, shadow prices must be used in investment and output pricing decisions to ensure the economically efficient use of resources. Moreover, if there are large income disparities, we will see later that even these "efficient" shadow prices must be further adjusted, especially to achieve socially equitable energy pricing policies for serving poor households.
I t is important to realize that lack of data, time, and manpower resources, particularly in the LDC context, will generally preclude the analysis of a full economy-wide model when energy-related decisions are made.2 Instead, the partial approach shown in Figure 1 may be used, where key linkages and resource flows between the energy sector and the rest of the economy, as well as interactions among different energy subsectors, are selectively identified and analyzed, using appropriate shadow prices such as the opportunity cost of capital, shadow wage rate, and marginal opportunity cost for different fuels. In practice, surprisingly valuable results may be obtained from relatively simple models and assumptions.
To clarify the basic concepts involved in optimal energy pricing we first analyze a relatively simple model. Next the effects of more complex features are examined, including short-run versus long-run dynamic considerations, capital indivisibilities, joint output cost allocation, quality of supply, and price feedback effects on demand. The process of establishing the efficient economic price in a given energy subsector may be conveniently analyzed in two steps (see Appendix A for details). First, the marginal opportunity cost (MOC) or shadow price of supply must be determined. Second, this value has to be further adjusted to compensate for demand-side effects arising from distortions in the prices of other goods, including other energy substitutes. From a practical viewpoint, an optimal pricing procedure that begins with MOC is easier to implement, because supply costs are generally well defined (from technological-economic considerations), whereas data on the demand curve are relatively poor.
Suppose that the marginal opportunity cost of supply in a given energy subsector is the curve MOC(Q) shown in Figure 2 . For a typical nontraded item like electricity, MOC that is generally upward sloping is calculated by first shadow pricing the inputs to the power sector and then estimating both the level and structure of marginal supply costs (MSC) based on a long-run system expansion p r~g r a m .~ For tradable items like crude oil and for fuels that are substitutes for tradables at the 3 . The same model will be modified in the next section to establish socially equitable subsidized prices for low-income consumers.
4 . For a detailed discussion of the procedures used in the electric power subsector, see Munasinghe (1979a) . In this subsector MSC is also called the long-run marginal cost margin, the international or border prices of the tradables (i.e., c.i.f. price of imports or f.0.b. price of exports, with adjustments for internal transport and handling costs) are appropriate indicators of MOC. "or most developing countries, such import or export MOC curves will generally be flat or perfectly elastic. Other fuels such as coal and natural gas could be treated either way, depending on whether they are tradables or nontraded. The MOC of nonrenewable, nontraded energy sources will generally include a "user cost" or economic rent component, in addition to the marginal costs of production. The economic values of traditional fuels are the most difficult to determine, because in many cases there is no established market. However, as discussed later, they may be valued indirectly on the basis of the savings they allow on alternative fuels such as kerosene, the opportunity costs of labor for gathering firewood, and/or the external costs of deforestation and erosion.
Thus, for a nontraded form of energy, MOC is the opportunity cost of inputs used to produce it plus a user cost where relevant, while for a tradable fuel or a substitute, MOC represents the marginal foreign exchange cost of imports or the marginal export earnings foregone. In each case, MOC measures the shadow-priced economic value of alternative output foregone because of increased consumption of a given form of energy. After identifying the correct supply curve, we next examine demand-side effects, especially second best corrections that 5 . We note that the use of border prices does not require the assumption of free trade, but implies that the numeraire or unit of value for shadow pricing is essentially uncommitted foreign exchange (but converted into local currency at the official exchange rate). For details. see Squire and van der Tak (1975).
. A nontraded item is generally characterized by a domestic supply price that lies
shnvo tho f n h nriro nf pvnnrts hllt holnw tho r i f nriro nf imnnrts capture interactions between different energy subsectors. This second step is just as important as the first one, and therefore it will be examined in some detail. In Figure 2 , the market-priced demand curve for the form of energy under consideration is given by the curve PD(Q), which is the consumers' willingness to pay. Consider a small increment of consumption A Q at the market price level p . The traditional optimal pricing approach at tempts to compare the incremental benefit of consumption due to AQ, that is, the area between the demand curve and x-axis, with the corresponding supply cost, that is, the area between the supply curve and x-axis. However, since MOC is shadow priced, P D must also be transformed into a shadow-priced curve to make the comparison valid. This is done by taking the increment of expenditure p.AQ and asking what is the shadow-priced marginal cost of resources used up elsewhere in the economy if the amount p . A Q (in market prices) is devoted to alternative consumption (andlor investment).
Suppose that the shadow cost of this alternative pattern of expenditure is b(p. AQ), where b is called a conversion factor. Then the transformed P D curve, which represents the shadow costs of alternative consumption foregone, is given by b.PD(Q); in Figure 2 , it is assumed that b < 1. Thus at the price p , incremental benefits E G J L exceed incremental costs EFKL. The optimal consumption level is Qopt, where the MOC and b.PD curves cross, or equivalently where a new pseudosupply curve MOC/b and the market demand curve P D intersect. The optimal or efficient selling price to be charged to consumers (because they react only along the market demand curve PD, rather than the shadow-priced curve b.PD) will be pe = MOC/b at the actual market clearing point B. At this level of consumption, the shadow costs and benefits of marginal consumption are equal, that is, MOC = b.PD. Since b depends on user specific consumption patterns, different values of the efficient pricep, may be derived for various consumer categories, all based on the same value of MOC. We clarify the foregoing by considering several specific practical examples.
First, suppose that all the expenditure (p A Q) is used to purchase a substitute fuel; that is, assume complete substitution. Then the conversion factor b is the relative distortion or ratio of the shadow price to market price of this other fuel. Therefore pe=MOC/b represents a specific second-best adjustment to the MOC of the first fuel, to compensate for the distortion in the price of the substitute fuel. Next, con-7. The general theorem of the second-best shows, for example, that if the price of a given fuel is not set at its MOC, then the efficient price of a close substitute also must diverge from its own MOC. For a detailed discussion of the theory of the second-best in economics, see Winch (1971) .
sider a less specific case in which the amount (p A Q) is used to buy an average basket of goods. If the consumer is residential, b would be the ratio of the shadow price to the market price of the household's market basket (here, b is also called the consumption conversion factor). The most general case would be when the consumer was unspecified, or detailed information on consumer categories was unavailable, so that b would be the ratio of the official exchange rate (OER) to the shadow exchange rate ( S E R ) , which is also called the standard conversion factor (SCF).' This represents a global second-best correction for the divergence between market and shadow prices averaged throughout the economy. l o
EXTENSIONS O F THE BASIC MODEL
The analysis so far has been static. However, in many instances the situation with regard to the availability of a given energy source, interfuel substitution possibilities, and so on tends to vary over time, thus leading to disequilibrium in certain fuel markets, and divergence of the short-run price from the long-run optimal price. This aspect is illustrated below by means of an example that shows how the optimal depletion rate and time path for MOC of a domestic nonrenewable resource will be affected by varying demand conditions, especially tradability, extent of reserves, and substitution possibilities.
8. For example, MOCEL could represent the long-run marginal cost of rural electricity (for lighting), and the substitute fuel could be imported kerosene. Suppose that the (subsidized) domestic market price of kerosene is set a t one-half its import (border) price for sociopolitical reasons. Then b = 2, and the efficient selling price of electricity p, = MOCEL/~ (ignoring differences in the quality of the two fuels, and capital costs of conversion equipment such as light bulbs, kerosene lamps, and partial substitution effects; a more refined analysis of substitution possibilities would have to incorporate these additional considerations). I t would be misleading, however, to then attempt to justify the subsidized kerosene price on the basis of comparison with the newly calculated low price of electricity. Such circular reasoning is far more likely to occur when pricing policies in different energy subsectors are uncoordinated, rather than in an integrated energy pricing framework. We note that all these energy sector subsidies must be carefully targeted to avoid leakages and abuses, as discussed in the next section.
9. Note that, with the foreign exchange numeraire, conversion of domestic price values into shadow-price equivalents by application of the SCF to the former is conceptually the inverse of the traditional practice of multiplying foreign currency costs by the SER (instead of the OER) to convert to the domestic price equivalent.
10. For example, suppose the border price of imported diesel is 4 pesos per liter (i.e., US$0.20 per liter, converted at the OER of 20 pesos per US$). Let the appropriate SER that reflects the average level of import duties and export subsidies be 25 pesos per US$.
Therefore SCF = OER/SER = 0.8, and the appropriate strictly efficient selling price of diesel is p, = 4 / 0 3 = 5 pesos per liter.
Suppose that the present-day marginal supply cost (MSC) (including extraction costs, and additional transport and environmental costs, etc., where appropriate) of a domestic energy source such as coal lies below the thermal equivalency price of an internationally traded fuel (e.g., petroleum or high-quality coal), as indicated by points A and B in Figure 3 . l 1 The international energy price that acts as the benchmark is assumed to rise steadily in real terms, along the path B E . Let us first examine two polar extremes based on simple, intuitively appealing arguments.
First, if the reserves are practically infinite and the use of this fuel at the margin will not affect exports or substitution for imports of traded fuels, then the MOC of the domestic energy source in the long run would continue to be based on the marginal supply cost, that is, along the path A C , which is upward sloping to allow for increases in real factor costs or extraction costs. On the other hand, suppose there is a ready export market for the indigenous resource, or substitution possibilities with respect to imported fuels. In this case the marginal use of this resource will reduce export earnings or increase the import bill for the international fuels in the short run, because the reserves are small or output capacity is limited. Then, the marginal opportunity cost would tend to follow the path AD and rise quickly toward parity with the international energy price. The actual situation is likely to fall between these two extremes, thus yielding alternative price paths such as AFE, or AGHE. Here, the initial use of the resource has no marginal impact on exports or import substitution, but there is gradual depletion of finite domestic reserves over time, and eventual transition to higher-priced fuels in the future. For a given volume of reserves, the rate of depletion of the domestic energy source will be greater, and the time to depletion will be shorter if its price is maintained low (i.e., on the path AGHE) for as long as possible rather than when the price rises steadily (i.e., along path AFE). The macroeconomic consequences of the path AGHE are also more undesirable because of the sudden price increase at the point of transition, when the domestic resource is exhausted. In practice the price path may well be determined by noneconomic factors. For example, the price of newly discovered gas or coal may have to be kept low for some years to capture the domestic market and displace the use of imported liquid fuels (which continue to be subsidized for political reasons). In general, the desire to keep energy prices low as long as possible must be balanced against the need to avoid a large price shock in the future.
More rigorous dynamic models, which maximize the net economic benefits of energy consumption over a long period, have been developed to determine the optimal price path and depletion rate; however, these models depend on factors such as the social discount rate, the size of reserves, the growth of demand, and the cost and time lag needed to develop a backstop technology (which could replace the international energy price as the upper bound on price). Uncertainties in future supply and demand-such as the possibility of discovering new energy resources or technologies-add to the complexities of dynamic analysis. The classical argument developed by Hotelling (1931) indicates that the rate of increase in the optimal rent (or difference between price and marginal extraction cost) for the resource should equal the rate of return on capital. (7). l 3 This implies that the optimal path of MOC would be IJE in Figure 3 , defined at any time t by 12. The preceding discussion is more useful for oil-importing or energy deficit LDCs. In the case of major oil exporters, the ability to influence the world market price and to determine the rate of resource depletion provides much greater flexibility. The huge foreign exchange surpluses and limited capacity to absorb investment imply decreased attractiveness of marginal export earnings coupled with the need to conserve oil resources. There is also greater ability to subsidize domestic oil consumption to meet basic needs and to accelerate economic development by increasing investment and expanding nonoil gross domestic product. See, for example, Samii (1979), pp. 16-26. . , , ,
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where JL is the rent at the time of depletion T. l4 Thus MOC consists of the current marginal costs of extraction, transport, environmental degradation, and so on (MSC) , plus the appropriately discounted "user cost" or foregone surplus benefits of future consumption ( J L ) . As T approaches infinity, IJ would tend toward AC, which is the infinite reserve case, while as T falls to zero, IJ would approximate AD more closely, corresponding to the case of very small reserves and rapid transition to the expensive fuel. We now consider another type of dynamic effect due to the growth of demand from year 0 to year 1, which leads to an outward shift in the market demand curve from PD, to PD, as shown in Figure 4 . Assuming that the correct market clearing price p, was prevailing in year 0, excess demand equal to GK will occur in year 1. Ideally, the supply should be increased to Q , and the new optimum market clearing price established a t p , . However, the available information concerning the demand curve PD, may be incomplete, making it difficult to locate the point L . 14. However, Heal (1976) shows that under certain conditions the optimal rent will fall to zero at the time of depletion. Other recent papers explore a variety of conditions, rr Uowt..,;rL 1 1 0 7 Q b mrr 9 A 7 . 7 K A a n r l n a r r i e r m 1 1 0 7 Q \ nn 9r\r\.QC7
Fortunately, the technical-economic relationships underlying the production function or known international prices usually permit the marginal opportunity cost curve to be determined more accurately. Therefore, as a first step, the supply may be increased to an intermediate level Q', at the pricep'. Observation of the excess demand M N indicates that both the supply and, if necessary, also the marginal cost price should be further increased. Conversely, if we overshoot L and end up in a situation of excess supply. then it may be necessary to wait until the growth of demand catches up with the oversupply. In this iterative manner, it is possible to move along the MOC curve toward the optimum market clearing point. As we approach it, note that the optimum is also shifting with demand growth, and therefore we may never hit this moving target. However, the basic guideline of pegging the price to the marginal opportunity cost of supply and expanding output until the market clears is still valid.
Next, we examine the practical complications raised by price feedback effects. Typically, a long-range demand forecast is made assuming some given future evolution of prices, a least-cost investment program is determined to meet this demand, and optimal prices are computed on the basis of the latter. However, if the estimated optimal price that is to be imposed on consumers is significantly different from the original assumption regarding the evolution of prices, then the first-round price estimates must be fed back into the model to revise the demand forecast and repeat the calculation.
In theory, this iterative procedure could be repeated until future demand, prices, and MOC estimates become mutually self-consistent. In practice, uncertainties in price elasticities of demand and other data may dictate a more pragmatic approach in which the MOC would be used to devise prices after only one iteration. The behavior of demand is then observed over some time period and the first-round prices are revised to move closer to the optimum, which may itself have shifted as described earlier.
When MOC is based on marginal production costs, the effect of capital indivisibilities or lumpiness of investments causes difficulties in many energy subsectors. Thus, owing to economies of scale, investments for electric power systems, gas production and transport, oil refining, coal mining, reforestation, and so on tend to be large and longlived. As shown in Figure 5 , suppose that in year 0 the maximum si~pply capacity is Q, while the optimum price and output combination (p ,, , Qo) prevails, corresponding to demand curve D o and the short-run marginal cost curve SRMC(e.g., variable, operating, and maintenance costs).
As demand grows from DO to D l over time and the limit of existing ~. n n o o ; t x r ; P v n o o h n A t h n -&on -t r o t h n ;no-oonrl t n rr t n o l n a r thn market-that is, "price rationing" occurs. When the demand curve has shifted to D z and the price is p2, capacity is increased to Q. However, as soon as the capacity increment is completed and becomes a sunk cost, price should fall to the old trend of SRMC-for example, ps is the optimum price corresponding to demand D 3 . Generally, the large price fluctuations during this process will be disruptive and unacceptable to consumers. This practical problem may be avoided by adopting a longrun marginal cost (LRMC) approach, which provides the required price stability while retaining the basic principle of matching willingness to pay and incremental supply costs. Essentially, the future capital costs of a single project or an investment program are distributed over the stream of output expected during the lifetime of this plant.15 This average investment cost per unit of incremental output is added to variable costs (SRMC), to yield LRMC, as shown in Figure 5 . '"
Another method of allocating capacity costs, known as peak load pricing, is particularly relevant for electricity and also natural gas. The basic peak load pricing model shown in Figure 6 has two demand curves; for example, Dpk could represent the peak demand during the x daylight and evening hours of the day when electric loads are large, while Dop would indicate the off-peak demand during the remaining (24x) hours when loads are light. The marginal cost curve is simplified assuming a single type of plant with the fuel, operating, and maintenance costs given by the constant a, and the incremental cost of capacity given by the constant b. The static diagram has been drawn to indicate that the pressure on capacity arises due to peak demand Dpk, while the off-peak demand Dop does not infringe on the capacity Q. The optimal pricing rule now has two parts corresponding to two distinct rating periods (i.e., differentiated by the time of day): peak period price ppk = a + b off-peak period price Pop = a 15. For example, capital costs could be annualized at the appropriate social discount rate and divided by the annual output, or an average incremental cost approach could be used; see Munasinghe (1979a) . If continued demand growth is expected, consumers' initial willingness to pay a price equal to the annual equivalent LRMC is assumed to imply willingness to do so over the lifetime of the asset.
16. Exceptions to the LRMC rule may lead to efficiency gains in certain cases. If substantial excess supply capacity exists, it could be appropriate to temporarily use SRMC (including both variable and user costs) as a basis for pricing to specific consumers. However, SRMC priced supplies must be decreased a s LRMC priced demand grows, and the temporary users of low-priced supplies should not be permitted to become a permanent burden. e.e.. an interm~tible load in electric Dower svstems. The logic of this simple result is that peak period users, who are the cause of capacity additions, should bear full responsibility for the capacity costs as well as fuel, operating, and maintenance costs, while off-peak consumers pay only the latter costs.17 Peak load pricing can also be applied in different seasons of the year.
Related problems of allocating joint costs arise in other energy subsectors as well-an example is the allocation of capacity costs of natural gas, or of refinery costs among different petroleum products. The former may be treated like the electricity case. For oil products, the light refinery cuts that are tradable, such as kerosene, .gasoline, and diesel, have benchmark international prices. However, other items like heavy residual oils may have to be treated like nontradables. Furthermore, associated gas that may be flared at the refinery is often assumed to have a low MOC, although subsequent storage and handling for use as LPG will add to the costs. A more complicated approach would be to use a programming model of a refinery to solve the dual problem as a means of determining shadow prices of distillates.
A more general aspect of the capacity constraint, which encompasses 1 7 . The most recent peak load pricing models indicate that in an optimally planned system, marginal capacity costs should be allocated in proportion to marginal shortage costs during two or more different rating periods. We note that if the peak period is too narrowly defined, peak load pricing may shift the peak to another rating period; this would be an extreme case of price feedback effects, which were discussed earlier. peak load pricing, is that energy prices have to be structured. For example, the MOC shown in Figure 2 may vary by the type of consumer, geographic location, time and level of consumption, voltage level (for electricity), and so on. These values of MOC then have to be modified to reflect demand-side considerations (as discussed earlier). Therefore, the economically efficient prices in a given energy subsector may exhibit considerable structuring.
The interrelated issues of supply and demand uncertainty, safety margins, and shortage costs also raise complications. We first illustrate this issue using electricity as an example, and then generalize the results for the other subsectors. Thus the least-cost system expansion plan to meet an electricity demand forecast is generally determined assuming some (arbitrary) target level of system reliability-e.g., lossof-load probability (LOLP), reserve margin, etc. Therefore, marginal costs depend on the target reliability level, when in fact economic theory suggests that reliability should also be treated as a variable to be optimized, and both price and capacity (or equivalently, reliability) levels should be optimized simultaneously. The optimum price is the marginal cost price as described earlier, while the optimum reliability level is achieved when the marginal cost of capacity additions (to improve the reserve margin) are equal to the expected value of economic cost savings to consumers due to electricity supply shortages averted by those capacity increments. These considerations lead to a more generalized approach to system expansion planning, as shown below. l 8
Consider a simple expression for the net benefits (NB) of electricity consumption, which is to be maximized:
where TB = total benefits of consumption if there were no outages; SC = supply costs (i.e., system costs); OC = outage costs (i.e., costs to consumers of supply shortages); D = demand; and R = reliability.
In the traditional approach to system planning (i.e., least-cost system expansion planning), both D and R are exogenously fixed, and therefore NB is maximized when SC is minimized. However, if R is treated as a variable, is the necessary first-order maximization condition.
Assuming a D / a R =0, We have: Therefore, as described earlier, reliability should be increased by adding to capacity until the above condition is satisfied. An alternative way of expressing this result is that since TB is independent of R , NB is maximized when total costs, TC = (SC + OC), are minimized. The above criterion effectively subsumes the traditional system planning rule of minimizing only the system costs. l g
We note that this approach may be generalized for application in other energy subsectors. Thus while sophisticated measures of reliability like LOLP do not exist outside the power subsector, the concept of minimizing total costs to society is still relevant. For example, in oil and gas investment planning, the costs of shortages due to gasoline queues, lack of furnace oil, or gas for domestic and industrial use may be traded off against the supply costs of increased storage capacity and greater delivery capability incurred by augmenting surface transport or pipeline systems. Clearly, these additional considerations would modify the marginal costs of energy supply and thus affect optimal pricing policies. Finally, externalities, especially environmental considerations, have to be included as far as possible in the determination of efficient energy prices. For example, if the building of a new hydroelectric dam results in the flooding of land that has recreational or agricultural value, or if urban transportation growth leads to congestion and air pollution, these costs should be reflected in MOC. 2 0 While such externality costs may, in certain cases, be quite difficult to quantify, they may already be included (at least partially) on the supply side, in terms of measures taken to avoid environmental degradation, for example, the cost of pollution control equipment a t an oil refinery or coal-burning electricity plant, or the cost of landscaping strip-mined land.
Estimation of environmental costs is most problematic in the case of noncommerical or traditional energy sources such as woodfuel, where marginal opportunity costs could be based (when appropriate) on the externality costs of deforestation, erosion, loss of watershed, and so on. Other measures of the economic value of traditional fuel would include the opportunity cost of labor required to collect woodfuel, or the cost savings from displaced substitute fuels such as kerosene and LPG.
ADJUSTMENTS TO EFFICIENT PRICES TO MEET OTHER OBJECTIVES
Once efficient energy prices have been determined, the second stage of pricing must be carried out to meet social, financial, political, and other constraints
We note that efficient energy prices deviate from the prices calculated on the basis of financial costs, because shadow prices are used instead of the market prices. This is done to correct for distortions in the economy. Therefore, the constraints that force further departures from efficient prices (in the second stage of the pricing procedure) may also be considered as distortions that impose their own shadow values on the calculation. 2 1 20. The latter case could form the basis for raising fuel prices, vehicle licencing fees, road user charges, parking charges, and so on in a large metropolis, relative to rural areas.
For details, see Munasinghe (1979a).

Subsidized Prices and Lifeline Rates
Sociopolitical or equity arguments are often advanced in favor of subsidized prices or "lifeline" rates for energy, especially where the costs of energy consumption are high relative to the incomes of poor households. Economic reasoning based on externality effects may also he used to support subsidies, for example, cheap kerosene to reduce excessive firewood use and prevent deforestation, erosion, and so on. To prevent leakages and abuse of such subsidies, energy suppliers must act as discriminating n~onopolists. Targeting specific consumer classes (for example, poor households) and limiting the cheap price only to a minimum block of consumption are easiest to achieve, in practice, for metered forms of energy like gas or electricity. Other means of discrimination, such as rationing, licensing, etc., may also be required. 2 2 All these complex and interrelated issues require detailed analysis. The concept of a subsidized "social" block, or "lifeline" rate, for lowincome consumers has another important economic rationale, based on the income redistribution argument. We clarify this point with the aid of Figure 7 , which shows the respective demand curves for energy AB and G H of low (I,) and average (I2) income domestic users, the social tariff ps over the minimum consumption block 0 to Qmin, and the efficient price levelp,. All tariff levels are in domestic market prices. If the actual price p = pe, the average household will be consuming at the "optimal" level Q2, but the poor household will not be able to afford the service.
If increased benefits accruing to the poor have a high social value, then, although in nominal domestic prices the point A lies below p,, the consumer surplus portion ABF multiplied by an appropriate social weight w could be greater than the shadow price of supply (see the appendix for details). The adoption of the block tariff shown in Figure 7 , consisting of the lifeline rateps, followed by the full tariff pe, helps capture the consumer surplus of the poor user but does not affect the optimum consumption pattern of the average consumer.23 In practice, the magnitude Qmin has to be carefully determined, to avoid subsidizing relatively well-off consumers; it should be based on acceptable criteria for identifying "low-income" groups and reasonable estimates of their minimum consumption levels (e.g., sufficient to supply basic energy requirements for the household). The level of p,
Unit prlce
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w a n t~t y relative to the efficient price may be determined on the basis of the poor consumer's income level relative to some critical consumption level, as shown in the appendix. The financial requirements of the energy sector would also be considered in determining ps and Qmin. This approach may be reinforced by an appropriate supply policy (e.g., subsidized house connections for electricity and special supply points for kerosene).
Financial Viability
The financial constraints most often encountered relate to meeting the revenue requirements of the sector, and are often embodied in criteria such as some target financial rate of return on assets, or an acceptable rate of contribution toward the future investment program. In principle, for state-owned energy suppliers, the most efficient solution would be to set the price at the efficient level, and to rely on government to subsidize losses or tax surpluses exceeding sector financial needs. In practice, some measure of financial autonomy and self-suf------that is placed on public funds, a pricing policy that results in failure to achieve minimum financial targets for continued operation of the sector would rarely be acceptable. The converse and more typical case, where efficient pricing would result in financial surpluses well in excess of traditional revenue targets, may be politically unpopular, especially for an electric utility. Therefore in either case, changes in revenues have to be achieved by adjusting the efficient prices.
It is intuitively clear that discriminating between the various consumer categories, so that the greatest divergence from the marginal opportunity cost-based price occurs for the consumer group with the lowest price elasticity of demand, and vice versa, will result in the smallest deviations from the "optimal" levels of consumption consistent with a strict efficiency pricing regime.14 In many countries the necessary data for the analysis of demand by consumer categories is rarely available, so rule-of-thumb methods of determining the appropriate tariff structure have to be adopted. However, if the energy subsector exhibits increasing costs (i.e., if marginal costs are greater than average costs), the fiscal implications should be exploited to the full. Thus, for example, electric power tariffs (especially in a developing country) constitute a practical means of raising public revenues in a manner that is generally consistent with the economic efficiency objective, at least for the bulk of the consumers who are not subsidized; at the same time they help supply basic energy needs to low-income groups. Similar arguments may be made in the petroleum subsector, where high prices for gasoline, based on efficiency, externality, and conservation arguments, may be used to cross-subsidize the "poor man's" fuel-kerosene, or diesel used for t r a n s~o r t a t i o n .~~
Other Considerations
There are several additional economic, political, and social considerations that may be adequate justification for departing from a strict efficient pricing policy. The decision to provide commercial energy like kerosene or electricity in a remote rural area (which often also entails subsidies because the beneficiaries are not able to pay the full price based on high unit costs), could be made on completely noneconomic grounds, e.g., for general sociopolitical reasons such as maintaining a viable regional industrial or agricultural base, stemming rural to urban migration, or alleviating local political discontent. Similarly, uniform nationwide energy prices are a political necessity in many countries, although this policy may, for example, imply subsidization of consumers in remote rural areas (where energy transport costs are high) by energy users in urban centers. However, the full economic benefits of such a course of action may be much greater than the apparent efficiency costs that arise from any divergence between actual and efficient price levels. Again this possibility is likely to be much more significant in a developing country than in a developed one, not only because of the high cost of energy relative to incomes in the former, but also because the available administrative or fiscal machinery to redistribute incomes (or to achieve regional or industrial development objectives by other means) is frequently ineffective. The conservation objective (to reduce dependence on imported energy, improve the trade balance, and so on) usually runs counter to subsidy arguments. Therefore, it may be necessary to restrict cheap energy to productive economic sectors that need to be strengthened, while in the case of the basic energy needs of households, the energy price could be sharply increased for consumption beyond appropriate minimum levels. In other cases, conservation and subsidized energy prices may be consistent. For example, cheap kerosene might be required, especially in rural areas, to reduce excessive woodfuel consumption and thus prevent deforestation and erosion.
I t is particularly difficult to raise prices to anywhere near the efficient levels where low incomes and a tradition of subsidized energy have increased consumer resistance. In practice, price changes have to be gradual, in view of the costs that may be imposed on those who have already incurred expenditures on energy using equipment and made other decisions, while expecting little or no change in traditional energy pricing policies. At the same time, a steady price rise will prepare consumers for high future energy prices. The efficiency costs of a gradual price increase can be seen as an implicit shadow value placed on the social benefits that result from this policy.
Finally, owing to the practical difficulties of metering, price discrimination, and billing, and the need to avoid confusing consumers, the pricing structure may have to be simplified. Thus, the number of customer categories, rating periods, consumption blocks, and so on, will have to be limited. Electricity and gas offer the greatest possibilities for structuring. The degree of sophistication of metering depends among other things, on the net benefits of metering and on problems of installation and maintenance. In general, various forms of peak electricity pricing (i.e., using maximum demand or time-of-day metering) would be particularly applicable to large-, medium-, and high-voltage indus-receiving a subsidized rate for electricity, a simple current limiting device may suffice, because the cost of even simple k w h metering may exceed the net benefits (which equal the savings in supply costs due to reduced consumption, less the decrease in consumption benefits). For electricity or gas, different charges for various consumption blocks may be effectively applied with conventional metering. However, for liquid fuels like kerosene, subsidized or discriminatory pricing would usually require schemes involving rationing and coupons, and could lead to leakage and abuses.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The 1970s have been characterized by increasing real costs of energy and fluctuations in relative fuel prices. This article has emphasized the importance of comprehensive energy planning, especially an integrated approach to energy pricing, due to the confusion arising from the often conflicting nature of national objectives, from the complexity of energy policy tools currently in use, including pricing, physical controls, technical methods, and public education, and from the many types of energy sources that may be used in a variety of applications.
Energy policymakers in developing countries face special difficulties, such as high levels of market distortion, shortages of foreign exchange and investment funds, large numbers of poor consumers whose basic energy needs must be met, and relatively greater usage of traditional fuels, in addition to the energy issues found in industrialized countries. Thus, an integrated pricing framework must begin with a clear statement of national objectives, and must provide a method for trading off among mutually contradictory goals. Important linkages between the energy sector and the rest of the economy, as well as interactions between and activities within different energy subsectors, must be analyzed using shadow prices, essentially within a partial equilibrium framework. For consistency, the shadow pricing methodology used for pricing energy sector outputs must be the same as the one used to make investment decisions. Special attention must also be paid to the hitherto neglected area of traditional fuels.
Energy pricing structures, disaggregated by energy subsector, are derived in two stages. First, the shadow-priced marginal opportunity cost (MOC) of a given form of energy is determined, based essentially on supply-side considerations. For a tradable form of energy. an appropriate measure of MOC would be the marginal cost of imports or export earnings foregone, with adjustments for local transport and handling costs. For nontraded fuels, MOC would be the marginal supply cost, nlus a user mst, mmnnnent. (in t.he rase nf nnnrenewnhle mnnnrresb Next, demand-side effects including distortions in the prices of other goods, esp&ially substitute fuels, are used to derive from the MOC the strictly efficient energy price level pe. In practice, this basic theoretical framework may be extended to cover dynamic effects relating to both supply and demand, price feedback effects, capital indivisibilities, problems of joint cost allocation, supply and demand uncertainty, shortage costs, and externalities.
In the second stage of the pricing procedure, the efficient price be) is further adjusted to yield a realistic pricing structure that meets socialsubsidy considerations, sector financial requirements, and other practical constraints such as the need to change prices gradually, simplicity of price structure for metering and billing, and so on.
Direct pricing policies are usually inapplicable in the traditional fuels subsector, due to the lack of well-developed markets for these forms of energy. Therefore, indirect methods-including augmentation of supply, the appropriate pricing of substitute fuels, improvements in the efficiency of woodfuel energy conversion, and punitive measures for excessive use-must be used in close coordination.
APPENDIX: MODEL FOR OP'TIMAL ENERGY PRICING USING SHADOW PRICES
I n this appendix, a general expression for the socially optimal price in the subsector for energy type A is developed based on shadow prices, to compensate for distortions in the economy. From the general equation, results for optimal energy pricing are derived, for cases that reflect the following:
1. a perfectly competitive economy (classical result) 2. efficient prices, including economic second best considerations 3. subsidized social prices or lifeline rates for poor consumers.
The supply and demand for a form of energy A is shown in Figure A-1, where S is the supply curve represented by the marginal cost of supply (evaluated a t domestic market prices), and D is the corresponding demand curve for a specific consumer. Starting with the initial combination of price and consumption (p,Q), consider the impact of a small price reduction (dp), and the resultant increase in demand (dQ), on the net social benefits of energy A consumption.
Before evaluating the net social benefit of this price change, let us define the shadow pricing framework.?' First, suppose we calculate the marginal cost of supply MC without shadow pricing, i.e., in market prices. Then up is defined as the energy A conversion factor (ACF), which transforms MCinto the corres- ponding real economic resource cost, i.e., with correct shadow pricing, the marginal opportunity cost is MOC = (apMC). Second, we assign a specific social weight Wc to each marginal unit of consumption (valued in market prices) of a given individual i in the economy. For example, if this user of energy A is poor, the corresponding social weight may be much larger than for a rich customer, to reflect society's emphasis on the increased consumption of low-income groups. Third, if the given individual's consumption of goods and services other than in the energy A subsector (valued in market prices) increases by one unit, then the shadow-priced marginal cost of economic resources used (or the shadow cost to the economy) is bi.
As a result of the price reduction, the consumer is using dq units more of energy A , which has a market value of (p . dQ) (i.e., area IFGH).17 However, the consumer's income has increased by the amountpQ -(p -dP) (Q + dQ), and assuming none of it is saved, this individual's consumption of other goods and services will increase by the amount (Q . dp -p dQ), also valued in market prices (i.e., area BEFG minus area IFGH). Therefore, the consumer's total consumption-that is, energy A plus other goods-will increase by the net amount (Q dp) in market prices. This is the traditional increase in consumer surplus benefits. The shadow value of this increased consumption is Wc (Q dp) where Wc is the social weight appropriate to this consumer's incomelconsumption level.
Next, consider the resource costs of these changes in consumption. The shadow cost of increasing the supply of energy A is (a . MC . dQ) (i.e., ap times area IJKH), and the resources used up to provi& the other additional goods consumed b, (Q . dp -p . dQ), where an is the conversion factor for energy A, and bc is the conversion factor for other goods consumed by this consumer. Finally, the income change of producer of energy A (if any) must also be considered, but this effect may be ignored if we assume quite plausibly that the producer is the government. The total increase in net social benefits due to the energy A price decrease is given by: Therefore:
where n = (p . dQ/Q . dp) is the elasticity of demand (magnitude). The necessary first-order condition for maximizing net social benefits, in the limit, is d(NB)/dp = 0. This yields the optimal price level:
This expression may be reduced to a more familiar form, by making some simplifying assumptions.
Case 1: Perfectly competitive economy where market prices and shadow prices are the same, and income transfer effects are ignored, i.e., no social weighting.
Therefore. up = Wc = bc = 1, and equation ( A . l ) reduces to This is the classical marginal cost pricing result, where net social benefits are maximized when price is set equal to marginal cost at the market clearing point (p,, Qc) in Figure A Case 2: Income transfer effects ignored, because the marginal social benefit of consumption is equal to the marginal social cost to the economy of providing this consumption.
Therefore, Wc = bc, and equation (A.1) becomes This is the optimal efficient price that emphasizes the efficient allocation of resources and neglects income distributional considerations.
As mentioned earlier, the marginal opportunity cost of energy A (MOC) may usually be evaluated in a straightforward manner (e.g., the international border price for a tradable fuel, or, in the case of a nontradable like electricity, hv nnnlvinu t h o annrnnriato sharlnw nriros t n t h o least m s t m i x n f t w h n i r n l l v determined inputs used in production). However, the conversion factor bc depends crucially on the type of consumer involved.
For residential consumers of energy A, bc represents the consumption conversion factor (CCF), which reflects the resource cost or shadow value of one (market-priced) unit of the household's marginal consumption basket. If the CCF < 1, then p; > MOC.
Anor her interesting case illustrates the application of equation (A.3) to corn ?~! for economic second-best consideration arising from energy substitution ponsit)ilities. As an extreme case, suppose all expenditures diverted from energy A consumption will be used to purchase alternative energy which is sut)sidized by the government (e.g., kerosene for lighting, or diesel for autogeneration). In this case, b , is the ratio of the marginal opportunity cost of ;il~.ernative energy to its market price. and may be written Since the alternative energy is priced below its border marginal cost, i.e., b, > 1, then p,f < MOC also. Therefore, the subsidization of substitute energy pricfhs will result in an optimal energy A price that is below its shadow supply c.ost. I f it is not possible to determine the consumption patterns of specific consumer groups, b , could be defined very broadly as the average conversion factor for all energy A users, e.g., the SCF, as discussed in the text.
CUSP . ' I : General Equation ( A . l ) is the optimal energy A price when shadow prices are used, which incorporate income distributional concerns.
Consider the case of a group of very poor consumers for whom we may assume W, S b,(n -1). Therefore, equation ( A . l ) may be written An even greater simplification is possible if it is assumed that n = 1; thus 28. The logic of this expression may be clarified by considering the case when the actual p > pz Then the shadow cost of one unit of expenditure on energy A is MOC/p while if this sum was used to purchase alternative energy the shadow cost would be MOCdp, Sincep > p: MOUp > MOCdp,, and the country is better off if more energy A is used instead of the alternative energy. there fore,^ should be reduced top: Similar reasoning can be used to show that if p < p : then p should be increased to the For illustration, suppose that the income/consumption level of these poor consumers (c) is one-third the critical income/consumption level ( F ), which is like a poverty line. Then a simple expression for the social weight is Therefore, p,* = MOC/3, which is the "lifeline" rate or subsidized tariff appropriate to this group of low-income consumers.
